Introduction
At TCC 2012, Dziembowski and Faust show how to construct leakage resilient circuits using secret sharing based on the inner product [2] . At Asiacrypt 2012, Ballash et al. turned the latter construction into an efficient masking scheme and they apply it to protect an implementation of AES against side-channel attacks [1] . The so-called Inner-Product masking (IP masking for short) was claimed to be secure with respect to two different security models: the λ-limited security model 3 (Section 4 of [1] ), and the d th -order security model (see definitions p.8 of [1] ). In the former model, the security proof makes sense for a sharing dimension n > 130 which is acknowledged impractical by the authors. In the latter model, the scheme is claimed secure up to the order d = n − 1.
In this note, we contradict the d th -order security claim by exhibiting a 1 st -order flaw in the masking algorithm for any chosen sharing dimension n.
Inner Product Masking Scheme
Let us first recall the basic principle of IP masking. In the following, F q will denote some field of characteristic 2 (i.e. q = 2 m for some m 1), and let ⊕ and ⊗ denote respectively the addition and the multiplication over F q . The inner product between two vectors X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ) and Y = (Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . , Y n ) from F n q is denoted by:
The principle of the IP masking scheme is to manipulate every sensitive variable V as a sharing composed of 2n elements, namely the coordinates of two vectors
In order to prevent a direct 1 st -order flaw, the coordinates of L are randomly drawn from F * q = F q \{0}. In order to perform computation in the masked domain, the authors of [1] define some addition and multiplication functions (IPAdd and IPMult) processing masked variables. Both of them are based on two building blocks: the IPHalfMask and IPRefresh procedures, which are recalled hereafter. 4 The IPHalfMask procedure (see Algorithm 1) takes a variable V ∈ F q and a half sharing L ∈ (F * q ) n and it outputs random half sharing R ∈ F n q satisfying V = L, R .
Balasch et al. claim that the above IP masking scheme is secure against any side-channel attack of order d = n − 1, or equivalently, that any family of n − 1 intermediate variables is independent of any sensitive variable. We contradict this claim hereafter by showing that for any fixed parameter n, there always exists a first-order side-channel attack on the IP masking scheme. To this end, we will exhibit an intermediate variable that is statistically dependent on some sensitive variable in both the IPRefresh and IPAdd procedures (Algorithms 2 and 3 above).
Let A = (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ) and B = (B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n ) be random vectors uniformly distributed over (F * q ) n , and let R = (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n ) be a random vector uniformly distributed over F n q , such that A, B and R are mutually independent. Consider the function f n defined by:
We first study f n with respect to n before exhibiting the IP masking flaw.
Study of f n
The study of f n developed in this section is recursive. First, in Lemma 1, we give an explicit expression to f 1 . Then, in Lemma 2, we exhibit a recursive relationship for f n . Both lemmas are eventually involved to provide an explicit expression to f n (Theorem 1).
Proof. First, since both A 1 and B 1 are non-zero, we have
Moreover, for any a = 0, we have
Similarly, we also have
Eventually, the total probability law together with the mutual independence between A 1 , B 1 and R 1 , imply
which for a = 0 and b = 0 gives
.
Moreover, we have
Proof. The first statement is true for n = 1 by Lemma 1. It is then implied by recurrence from the second statement. Therefore, we only need to show the latter statement. For every n > 1, the total probability law implies
1. For (a, b) = (0, 0), the terms in the sum (2) are of the form f n (a 0 , b 0 )f 1 (a 0 , b 0 ). Then by Lemma 1, we get
2. For (a, b) ∈ {0} × F * q , the terms in the sum (2) are of the form f n (a 0 , b ⊕ b 0 )f 1 (a 0 , b 0 ), with b = 0. Then by Lemma 1, we get
We deduce
For (a, b) ∈ F * q × {0}, we have the same equality by symmetry of the function f n .
3. For (a, b) ∈ F * q × F * q , the terms in the sum (2) are of the form
Equations (3), (4) and (5) directly yield the second statement.
Theorem 1. For every n 1 we have
where P is the matrix of eigenvectors which satisfies
By recursively applying (6), we can express (f 00 n , f 01 n , f 11 n ) with respect to (f 00 
Application to the IP Masking Scheme
The flaw occurs in the mask-refreshing procedure IPRefresh and in the addition procedure IPAdd (see in Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3). For the sake of clarity, we first detail it in the IPRefresh setting and then show it occurs as well in the IPAdd procedure.
Flaw in mask-refreshing procedure. The IPRefresh procedure takes an IP masking (L, R) of some sensitive variable V (i.e. such that V = L, R ), and it returns a fresh masking (L , R ) such that V = L , R . The first step of the procedure consists in randomly picking some vector A ∈ F n q such that A i = L i for every i. Then one computes L = L ⊕ A and X = A, R . Note that L and L are mutually independent and both uniformly distributed over (F * q ) n . We show hereafter that X leaks information on the sensitive variable V . Indeed we have
Then from
we get
By Theorem 1 and given that Pr[V = v] = 1 q , (7) gives
for v = 0, and
We see that when the sensitive variable V equals 0, then the intermediate variable X is more likely to equal 0 than another value in F q . On the other hand, when V does not equal 0, the sensitive variable X is more likely to be any value of F q but v. Although the bias is exponentially small in n, for small values of n it may induce a significant information leakage.
Flaw in the addition procedure. The IPAdd procedure is subject to a similar flaw. Indeed at Step 3 of Algorithm 3, one computes
where L and K are mutually independent and both uniformly distributed over (F * q ) n . Therefore the distribution of Z given V = L, R suffers the exact same bias as the distribution of X in the IPRefresh procedure.
Remark 2. It can be noted that the IPMult procedure looks more secure. Indeed except for the IPRefresh call, we did not find any flaw in the actual algorithm. Moreover the IPRefresh procedure is called on a sharing of dimension n 2 . Hence, even for small values of n, the observed bias quickly becomes very small.
Mutual Information Evaluation of the First-Order Flaw
We have seen in Section 3.2 that Balasch et al. 's proposal possesses a first-order flaw whatever the masking dimension n of their scheme. To complete our study, we conduct hereafter an information theoretic evaluation of the flaw in a common leakage model (namely Hamming weight leakage with Gaussian noise). We compare the quantity of leaking information from the flaw with that of the natural nth-order leakage from the right half sharing R for n = 2 and n = 3.
To quantify the amount of leaking information, we model the relationship between the physical leakage and the manipulated variables as follows. Each tuple of variables (
where HW denotes the Hamming weight function and N j denotes an independent Gaussian variable with mean 0 and standard deviation σ. We use the notation L ← (V 1 , V 2 , · · · , V t ) to refer to this association. To compare the information revealed by the flaw and that revealed by the leakage the right half sharing, we computed the mutual information 5 I(V, L) between the sensitive variable V = L, R and the leakage L in the following situations:
Right-half leakage for n = 3:
First-order flaw for n = 2:
First-order flaw for n = 3:
Figure 4 summarizes the information theoretic evaluation for each leakage (8) to (11). It can be observed that for each sharing dimension n, there exists a gap value of σ up to which the first-order flaw become more informative than the overall right-half leakage. For instance, for n = 2, this gap value is σ ≈ 4.5. This observation is in accordance with the soundness of the d th -order security notion: a security at a greater order implies a smaller asymptotic leakage (with respect to an increasing noise). We also emphasize that the d th -order security notion is relevant towards more practical issues: the resynchronization of leakage traces and 5 As shown in [3] , the number of measurements required to achieve a given success-rate in a maximum likelihood attack is related to the mutual information evaluation and it roughly equals c × I(A, L) −1 , where c is a constant related to the chosen success-rate. detection of the points of interest. These issues make higher-order attacks much more difficult to mount in practice than first-order ones. As a consequence, the first-order flaw has a greater impact from a practical point of view than suggested in Fig. 4 .
